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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-21-3(2)(2002). 
APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Appellee's statement of the issues presented are stated differently than as set 
forth in the statement provided by Appellant; however, the following statements track 
the issues argued in Appellant's Brief. 
I. Did the trial court correctly determine that Smith conveyed his interest in the 
Tundra, Navigator and Hydroswift, despite Cazares' allegation that Smith 
failed to comply with U.C.A. § 41-la-702(l)(a) and § 41-la-902? 
Standard of Review: De Novo. Because this is a question of law, the trial 
court's legal conclusions are given no deference and its decision is reviewed 
for correctness. White v. Gary L. Deeselhorst, NP Ski Corp., 879 P.2d 
1371, 1374 (Utah'1994). 
II. Did the trial court correctly determine that U.C.A. § 41-la-702(l)(a) and § 
41-la-902 fail to provide a private right of action? 
Standard of Review: De Novo. Because this is a question of law, the trial 
court's legal conclusions are given no deference and its decision is reviewed 
for correctness. White, 879 P.2d at 1374. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The interpretation of the following statutes may be determinative, or of central 
importance, to this appeal: 
1. U.C.A. § 41-la-702(l)(a): "To transfer a vehicle, vessel, or outboard motor the 
owner shall endorse the certificate of title issue for the vehicle, vessel, or 
outboard motor in the space for assignment and warranty of title." 
2. U.C.A. § 41-la-702(l)(b): "The endorsement and assignment shall include a 
statement of all liens or encumbrances on the vehicle, vessel, or outboard 
motor." 
3. U.C.A. § 41-la-902(2): "At the time of any sale or transfer of a motor vehicle, 
the transferor shall furnish to the transferee a written odometer disclosure 
statement in a form prescribed by the division. This statement shall be signed 
and certified as to its truthfulness by the transferor...." 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This case is a breach of contract dispute for the sale of three vehicles, including 
a Toyota Tundra ("Tundra"), a Lincoln Navigator ("Navigator") and a Hydroswift boat 
and trailer ("Hydroswift"). The Plaintiff/Appellee is the seller of these three vehicles 
and Defendant/Appellant is the buyer. 
On October 25, 2005 the parties came before the Fourth District Court, the 
Honorable Anthony W. Schofield presiding, for trial. R. at 237. At the conclusion of 
trial, the court issued the following undisputed findings of fact (undisputed because 
Cazares is not appealing the findings): 
1. In March 2003 the parties entered into an agreement that Cazares would buy and 
Smith would sell the Tundra on terms whereby Cazares agreed to become 
obligated for the remaining payments due on Smith's underlying obligation to the 
lender. R. at 236. 
2. Subsequently, on June 9, 2003, the parties memorialized their agreement in 
writing regarding the Tundra ("Tundra Agreement"). Id. 
3. Pursuant to the Tundra Agreement, Cazares agreed to purchase the Tundra from 
Smith for the purchase price of all monthly payments remaining on the 
underlying financing agreement between Smith and the lender, to make such 
payments on a timely basis, to maintain insurance on the vehicle in his own 
name for so long as Smith retained title to the Tundra and to maintain the vehicle 
in good operating condition. R. at 235-3.6. 
4. The parties also agreed that Smith would hold title to the Tundra until Cazares 
paid all payments in a timely manner pursuant to the Tundra Agreement. R. at 
235. 
5. Further, the parties agreed that Cazares would have possession of the Tundra so 
long as he was not in breach of any material term of the Tundra Agreement. Id. 
6. Cazares received delivery of and accepted the Tundra approximately eight 
months before the parties entered into the Tundra Agreement. At the time of the 
Tundra Agreement, Cazares again accepted the Tundra and retained possession. 
Id. 
7. Cazares breached his obligations under the Tundra Agreement by failing to make 
payments as they were due and in the amount that they were due. Cazares also 
refused and failed to return possession of the Tundra to Smith after he had 
defaulted and he kept the Tundra in his possession for at least eight months 
without making the required payments. R. at 234. 
8. Eventually, Cazares surrendered the Tundra to Toyota Financial for 
repossession in January 2004. Id. 
9. Also on June 9, 2003, the parties entered into a written agreement for the 
purchase and sale of the Navigator ("Navigator Agreement"). The terms of the 
Navigator Agreement were identical to the terms of the Tundra Agreement, 
except that the amount of the monthly payments differed. R. at 235. 
10. On or about this same day, Cazares accepted and held possession of the 
Navigator until he returned the vehicle to Smith. Id. 
11. Cazares also breached his obligations under the Navigator Agreement by 
surrendering the Navigator to Smith on September 13, 2003 and failing to make 
any payments thereafter. Cazares also failed to maintain insurance on the 
Navigator, which caused the lender to place a substitute insurance on the vehicle 
and bill Smith for the insurance cost. R. at 234. 
12. Shortly prior to July 3, 2003, the parties entered into a verbal agreement 
whereby Cazares agreed to purchase the Hydroswift from Smith on terms 
identical to the terms and provisions of the Tundra Agreement, except that the 
monthly payments were set at a different amount ("Hydroswift Agreement"). 
Id. 
13. The terms of the Hydroswift Agreement are set forth in an unsigned document 
that the trial court found to reflect the agreement reached by the parties. Id. 
14. On July 3, 2003, at Smith's instruction, Cazares picked the Hydroswift up from 
storage at the boat dealer's place of business. Cazares informed the dealer that 
he was purchasing the Hydroswift from Smith. Smith's wife confirmed the sale 
with the dealer via telephone. R. at 233-34. 
15. Subsequently, Cazares'paid for the service charges on the Hydroswift and took 
possession of the boat. That same day Cazares met Smith's wife and son to 
receive training and instruction on operating the boat. R. at 233. 
16. At that time, Smith's wife also gave Cazares the written Hydroswift 
Agreement. Cazares agreed to sign the Hydroswift Agreement and deliver it to 
the Smiths. Id. 
17. Cazares took possession of the Hydroswift and held possession until he 
returned the boat to Smith on September 13, 2003. At the time Cazares returned 
the Hydros wift, it was in damaged condition, including the hull, propeller, skeg, 
upholstery and the interior. Id. 
18. Cazares breached his obligations under the Hydroswift Agreement by failing to 
make the required payments. Id. 
19. Following the return of the Navigator and Hydroswift, and the repossession of 
the Tundra, Smith attempted to make monthly payments on the vehicles, but was 
unable to financially make all payments. Thus, Smith voluntarily surrendered 
the Navigator and Hydroswift to the respective financial lenders. R. at 232-33. 
20. Each vehicle was sold by the respective financial lender and Smith was charged 
with the costs of sale. Further, after deducting the amount realized from each 
sale, Smith was charged a deficiency judgment for the remaining unpaid 
obligations. R. at 232. 
21. Smith's action in voluntarily permitting repossession of the vehicles and 
allowing them to be resold was reasonable under the circumstances. R, at 23 L 
22. Each of the agreements entered into between the parties provide for an award 
of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to the prevailing party in any action to 
enforce the terms of the agreements. R. at 230. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Cazares is appealing the trial court's ruling that Smith transferred title to the 
Tundra, Navigator and Hydroswift despite his failure to comply with U.C.A. §41-1 a-
702 and § 414a-902. Further, Cazares is appealing whether the default provision in 
the agreements between the parties is valid and enforceable. However, Cazares appeal 
should be dismissed and the trial court's ruling should be affirmed for the reasons set 
forth below. 
First, Cazares failed to properly raise either of these issues in the trial court and, 
thus, they are not ripe for appeal. For example, at trial, the court held that Cazares 
failed to properly plead his claims regarding U.C.A. § 41-la-702 and § 41-la-902. 
Further, Cazares did not raise an issue and there was no discussion at trial regarding 
the enforceability of the default provisions. Accordingly, Cazares' appeal should be 
dismissed because he failed to properly raise these issues below. 
Second, Cazares claims that the facts are undisputed and only an issue of law is 
on appeal. However, Cazares inconsistently asserts many findings that contradict the 
Court's actual findings. In order for Cazares to properly challenge the Court's factual 
findings, he must marshal all the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and 
demonstrate that even viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to Smith* the 
evidence is insufficient to support the Court's findings. 
However, Cazares failed to marshal any evidence in support of the Court's 
findings and has placed that burden upon Smith instead. In reviewing the trial 
testimony and exhibits, the record demonstrates that the trial court had sufficient 
evidence to find the parties entered into written contracts for the Tundra and the 
Navigator, and a binding oral agreement for the Hydroswift. The Court also had 
sufficient evidence to find that Smith mitigated his damages. Accordingly, this Court 
should accept the trial court's factual findings in full and disregard Cazares' challenges 
to said findings since he failed to appropriately marshal the evidence. 
Third, assuming arguendo this Court finds Cazares has properly preserved his 
issues on appeal, his appeal should be dismissed nonetheless because U.C.A. § 41-1 a-
702 and § 41-la-902 do not create a private right of action for Cazares. Smith's failure 
to convey the certificate of title and/or odometer disclosure statement potentially only 
creates a right of action for the State. In fact, Cazares admits that the State, not 
Cazares, has an interest in maintaining accurate motor vehicle information. Cazares is 
not harmed by the State's inability to maintain accurate motor vehicle records. 
Further, the statutes do not prevent parties from entering into other sale 
agreements. The pertinent statutory provisions are not intended to be controlling 
between parties to a transaction. They do not confer substantive rights and are merely 
intended to warn prospective purchasers of existing encumbrances. Thus, the mere fact 
that Smith did not comply with these statutes, does not give Cazares the right la enter 
into these contracts, use the vehicles for months without making die required payments 
and then claim he has no interest in the vehicles under U.C.A. § 41-la-702 and §41-
la-902. Moreover, Cazares fails to cite any legal support providing him with a private 
right of action. 
Fourth, Cazares' appeal is without merit because he received equitable title to 
the vehicles. Cazares claims he never received an interest in the vehicles because 
Smith did not convey the certificate of title or odometer disclosure statement. 
However, these requirements do not convey substantive rights and equitable title may 
pass regard lev - •'.-*•*• >•;-*• • •* •• :-.- • • ;!L. b^a r 
equitable title holder upon the bona fide sale, despite the fact thai iee;.il pt.. « • -t 
formally been transferred i-u; liis name. 
Mfth -. azares' appeal is without merit because Smith's failure to comply with 
the statutes does uo( negate Cazares1 euulraeiual oh Miu-n- r \- -^ne ee poor policy to 
allow a buyer to enter into a contract for the sale of a -\.M;I. \ WM -osse-- - : ,; 
vehicle, not make any payments on the vehicles and then claim no responsibility for the 
vehicles under I J. C A. § 41 -1 a,702 and § 41 -1 a-902. 
* • r. . •• .r..r . - "•>- . «.-• ee^a- ;ic u ^ i n damages under 
U.C.A ^ "70A-2-709instea! .>J ^ - . . •••• * •• : ^ / - i ^ , : ^ 
Thus, the validity of the default provision is irrelevant to the trial court's decision 
Finally, Smith is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs since he was 
awarded fees below, ^ and such is provided \o\ in the agreements between the parties, 
• • AUCJIIMKINT "•: ' ' ' •' 
I. CAZARES FAILED TO RAISE HIS APPEAL ISSUES BKI ( >\V 
Cazares is appealing whether the v:\-A court erred in holding that Smith transferred 
title in L,A, i UNW,,» \aviLiau*: and I fydroswift boat despite Smith's failure to comply 
' s - ' \. u.tiiCi, ^a/.ares is appealing whether the 
"Event of Default" provision n, ii/ <<r/ * -i:<. ee- .• ^orreable between the pjities, 
However, Cazares failed to properly raise these issues below and thus, they are 
not ripe for appeal. "It is axiomatic that defenses and claims not raised by the parties 
in the trial cannot be considered for the first time on appeal." Bangerter v. Poulton, 
663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted). See also Hart v. Salt Lake Co. 
Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 129-30 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
As to Cazares' claims regarding U.C.A. § 41-1A-702 and § 41-1A-902, the trial 
court already ruled that Cazares failed to plead either of these claims properly. R. at 
265:16-22. Specifically, the trial court stated that, "the law obligates a person who is 
wishing to raise affirmative defenses to plead them, meaning to put everybody on 
notice of them. The first time that [these claims] are then disclosed in the court's file is 
here today." Id. Further, the trial court emphasized "there is no pleading that raises 
an affirmative defense." Id. At 266:3-4. Moreover, Cazares also failed to properly 
raise the issue that the contracts between the parties were allegedly unenforceable due 
to the default provision. 
Accordingly, Cazares failed to properly raise the applicability of U.C.A. § 41-
1A-702 and § 41-1A-902 as an affirmative defense and he also failed to properly raise 
the issue of the enforceability of the default provision. Thus, Cazares' appeal should 
be dismissed since he failed to properly raise the issues below as required. 
II. CAZARES FAILED TO MARSHAL FACTS AND EVIDENCE IN 
SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION 
If this Court finds that Cazares properly raised his appeal issues below, his appeal 
should nonetheless be narrowly construed and dismissed. Although Cazares attempts to 
present his appeal issues as questions of law, he simultaneously challenges the trial 
court\ findiin' of fart. However, an appellate courl will aiuse lo address such 
challenges to the findings unless the a^ncllant has property marshaled the ev idence. 
See Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433-34 (Utah 1998); Witear v. Labor Comm'n, 973 
P.2d 982, 985 ( [ Jtah Ct. App. 1998). "To successfully attack the verdict, an appellant 
mu st i nai \shal i ill the " evidence supporting the verdict and then demonstrate that, even 
v i e w i n g the e v i d e n c e in i\\r lii'bt I I H N favorable to dial ve rd ic t , I In: e v i d e n c e is 
insufficient to support it." Martinez v. Wells, 88 P.3d 343, 349 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) 
(citations omitted; emphasis added). 
If an appellant fails to properly marshal facts, "the court of appeals must assume 
that the record, supports the findings of the trial coi n f ' Egg eft v. W asalch Energy 
Corp,, 2004 UT 28, f 10 (citation omitted); Valcarce I ' Fitzgerald, 961 P 2< 3 3 0 5 , 312 
(Utah 1998). If an appellant properly marshals the evidence, he must show that such 
evidence is legally insufficient to support the challenged findings when viewing the 
evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to the decision. Child, 972 P.2d at 
433. Finally, not only must the courl of appeals com hide tin! a finding b a;.»anM fhr 
clear weight of the evidence for it to be clearly erroneous, but the court of appeals must 
also "give 'due regard' to the trial court's opportunity to assess the credibility of the 
numeroi is witnesses called by eacl i part y.: " Reid \ \ M utual of Omaha Insurance Co,, 
776P.2d896, 9w= - i . ^ *989) 
In the present case, the trial court issued detailed findings based on a full day of 
testimony and more than 30 exhibits introduced into evidence. Despite these findings, 
Cazares has failed to marshal any evidence in support of the trial court's findings. 
Further, Cazares has failed to acknowledge that the trial evidence must be viewed in a 
light most favorable to Smith and that the appellate court must give "due regard" to the 
trial court's ability to assess the credibility of witnesses. 
Because Cazares has failed to marshal evidence in support of the trial court's ruling, 
but instead has placed that burden on Smith to show this Court that evidence exists to 
support the trial court's ruling (evidence which Cazares should have marshaled), this 
Court should accept the trial court's findings in full and ignore Cazares' challenges to 
said findings. Following is a list of trial testimony and documentary exhibits that 
support the trial court's ruling: 
1. First, Cazares claimed that the parties allegedly did not enter into a written 
agreement for the Lincoln. However, this is contrary to the trial court's< 
findings and evidence presented at trial. 
• Trial Exhibit 22 is a written contract entered into on June 9 that provides for 
the sale of the Navigator, 
• The Court found that Cazares had the Navigator in his possession. R. at 
263. 
• The Court found that Cazares surrendered the Navigator on the 13th of 
September 2003. Id. 
2. Second, Cazares asserted that the parties did not enter into an agreement for 
the Hydroswift. Yet, the evidence presented demonstrates and the trial court 
found that the parties entered into a binding oral agreement for the Hydroswift 
• Miiith testified that Cazares wished to buy the boat. The trial court found 
that Smith's testimony was the most credible and consistent with all the 
evidence. R. at 264. 
® Smith testified that the dealer would not allow Cazares to t;.> ;ae 
Hydroswift without call Smith to verify that he was selling 
• Cazares paid for repairs to the Hydroswift and took it. Id, 
• Cazares received instruction from Smith's family members on how to use 
the Hydroswift Id. 
• Cazares was presented with a contract for the Hydroswift (similar iv the 
contracts for the Tundra and Navigator) and he agreed to the terms. A7. 
See also Trial Exhibit ?4. 
3. Third, Cazares aUr*!r- M,^
 M ;i(h failed in i!titii»ate hr damages. Again, tins 
is contrary to die Courfs findings that Smith did a number of things to 
mitigate damages. 
• Smith permitted the underlying lenders to retake possession of the 
property. R. at 231 
• Each lender eventually resold I heir repossessed property in a reasonable 
fashion. R. at 165-67. 
• Smith credited Cazares for the amounts his loans were reduced as a result 
of the proceeds from the auction sales. R. at 165. 
Accordingly, based on the foregoing lists of testimony and exhibits which Cazares 
failed to marshal in his appeal brief, the trial court's findings that the parties entered 
into binding contracts for the Pi indra , Navigator and Hydrosudi is well supported in 
the record. Also, the trial court newr made ;i fnidim' UKM ( -iniUi alleged]}' jailed h» 
mitigak hi damages. The evidence demonstrates Cazares' complete failure of 
•'...'iiiiiii: his duiv on appeal to marshal facts in support of the trial court's findings and 
' ..:•'.- hs *• *.• v ..K atl), based on the ease law eu-,-d aiu^-e, this Court should accept 
the trial court's findings in fall and reject Cazares' unsupported challenges to said 
findings. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT U.C.A. § 41-1A-
702 AND U.C.A. § 41-1A-902 DO NOT CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT 
OF ACTION FOR CAZARES 
Cazares' appeal should be dismissed because U.C.A. § 41-1A-702 and U.C.A. § 
41-1A-902 fail to provide him with a private right of action. Cazares argues that Smith 
allegedly failed to convey his interest in the Tundra, Navigator and Hydros wift because 
he never conveyed a certificate of title (U.C.A. § 41-1A-702) or an odometer 
disclosure statement (U.C.A. § 41-1A-902). However, assuming arguendo that interest 
in a vehicle does not transfer without a conveyance of the certificate of title and 
odometer disclosure statement - which Smith contests below - such does not create a 
private right of action for Cazares. 
The Motor Vehicle Act provides that "[t]o transfer a vehicle, vessel, or outboard 
motor the owner shall endorse the certificate of title issued for* the vehicle, vessel, or 
outboard motor . . . ." U.C.A. §41-la-702(l)(a). Further, "[a]t the time of any sale 
or transfer of a motor vehicle, the transferor shall furnish to the transferee a written 
odometer disclosure statement in a form prescribed by the division . . . ." U.C.A. § 
41-la-902(2). 
However, the trial court correctly held that neither statute prevents the parties from 
entering into other agreements. R. at 266:7-9. Thus, simply because Smith did not 
convey title or an odometer disclosure statement, does not prevent the parties from 
-. ^rriKj into contractual obligations nor does it give Cazares the right to enter into 
these contracts, i lse these vehicles, keep the ' I i mdra for many months withoi it payii lg 
for it and then claim he has no liability because he never had an interest in the vein, t is 
under these statutes. See R. at 266:11 15 Ultimately, the right of action belongs ,u 
the State - i.e., the Motoi V ehicle Department, <V nc M-L-. court held: "If the Motor 
Vehicle Department wants to come and attack the validity of this transaction they may 
do so." Id. at 266:9-11. In fact, Cazares failed to cite any legal support pinvitlini! linn 
with a private right of action pursuant to these statutes. 
Instead, Cazares relies on policy reasons for establishing a private right >f u<„ik . 
I ?or example, Cazares claims that the purpose behind these statutes is for the State to 
maintain accurate motor vehicle records and to a ssist in identifying vehicle owners, I le 
also asserts that these statutes protect the interests of financial institutions as secured 
creditors. Assuming these policies are supported by IJ.C.A. § 41-1A-702 and/or 
U.C.A. § 41-1A-902, Cc:/;:"^ :;:;[> u. -...\piaiL u-^w -.a;d policies provide'him., with, a 
private right, of action If invfhini1. those policies suppott Si MI t IT •- [position dial (lie 
statutes provide the State with a right of action, and not Cazares. Under these policies, 
Cazares is not harmed by the State's inability to maintain accurate motor vehicle 
records or a financial iiMiluhoifs ability to track, its interest in, collateral. Thus, neither 
of these policies support Cazares' posmon thai 11 ( \A ft -| I I A 1\)1 andon i i,(' A $ 
41 • IA-902 provide a private cause of action. 
The only policy presented by Cazares to possibly support his argument that U.C.A. 
§ 41-1A-702 and U.C.A. § 41-1A-902 provide a private right of action is that the 
statutes protect individuals from fraudulent conveyances. Cazares explains that where a 
debtor encumbers his interest in a motor vehicle to a third-party, this third-party's 
interest is supposedly unprotected absent a written record or conveyance of title. The 
third-party could be required to make all the payments to the lien holder under the guise 
he would obtain title, yet he would allegedly have no recourse against the debtor since 
the third-party's name is not on any of the documents. 
However, this policy also fails to create a private right of action generally for a 
third-party and specifically for Cazares. In a general sense, the statutes fail to confer 
any substantive rights and are merely intended to warn prospective purchasers of 
existing encumbrances. The statutes are not intended to protect a party involved in the 
transaction. For example, in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Group, 868 P.2d 110 (Utah Ct. App. 1994),-the Court examined U.C.A. §; 41-1-72 
(1988), which contains similar language and requirements as the statutes at issue in the 
present case.1 Id. at 112. Yet the Utah Supreme Court held that this section does "not 
'U.C.A. §41-1-72provides: 
Until the department shall have issued such new certificate of registration and 
certificate of ownership, delivery of any vehicle required to be registered shall 
be deemed not to have passed, and said intended transfer shall be deemed to 
be incomplete and not to be valid or effective for any purpose.... 
Although this section is no longer a part of the Motor Vehicle Act, the requirements are 
comparable to those set forth in U.C.A. § 41-1A-702 and U.C.A. § 41-1A-902 and the 
interpretation of this section is applicable to the statutes currently at issue. 
confer or deny substantive rights ' , but that it merely provides "a flag of warning to 
piospective innsferees or «*iieurnbntiinH hi «t< ' I ' nun;." Jtiikso^ \ lames. W V Id 
235, 237 (Utah 1939). U.C.A. § 414-72 was "written to protect innocent f )urchasers 
and third parties from fraud", but it was "not intended to be controlling as between the 
parties to a transaction." Id. (emphasis added). 
Fin tlu- . • \ ;i^:u- ^p»':ii<-lK i -.euan* i- ,i i.i.;J-party consistently makes 
payments on a uiuioi velikk- : h w v ,•'.-' '•: • •••*•• i ••'• ! • ;. mc-its establishing at 
least an equitable interest in the vehicle as well as a contractual obligation on the seller 
to transfer title. Also, the third-party would have recourse against the debtor through 
;i .LM;: •;. VMT ?. , ^ . .MIW snd evidence could be presented to establish the agreement 
betwec flj • . •• * ; . * ' - 'i M. transfer of acertiri ••- • ir.ic r\ \ .v-M\-- :e> i 
third-party would not automatically establish a contractual relationship hetu ••••?! • 
parties in any event. A court would nonetheless be required to hear the evidence and 
testimony'feprd'ffif'-thS'parties' agreement, with or without a transfer of title. 
Specifically, tin private right of aelion r; created lm Cazares because he was a party 
to the transaction. In addition, Cazares' policy argument fails becai ise the parties did in 
fact have written records formalizing their agreements. The statutes provide no 
protection for Cazares against a fraudulent conveyance in this instance because the 
UMiisaetions were documental ,'iiid - y- •{>". >.i : . -. i c.igage iu ai:\ iraudulent conduct. 
Accordingly, C.C.A §41 I A- /U1 and 11( \ A fid I i A (KL! fail to piovkh 
Cazares with a private right of action. 
IV. CAZARES' APPEAL IS WITHOUT MERIT BECAUSE HE 
RECEIVED EQUITABLE TITLE TO THE VEHICLES AND SMITH'S 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS 
DOES NOT NEGATE CAZARES' CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 
Even if Cazares establishes that U.C.A. § 41-1A-702 and/or U.C.A. § 41-1A-902 
provide a private right of action, his appeal should be denied because it is without merit. 
A. Cazares Received Equitable Title to the Vehicles 
Cazares asserts that Smith allegedly failed to convey interest in the Tundra, 
Navigator and Hydroswift because Smith never conveyed the certificate of title or an 
odometer disclosure statement. However, U.C.A. § 41-1A-702 and U.C.A. § 41-1A-902 
do not convey substantive rights, they are merely procedural or evidentiary in nature, 
meaning that equitable title may pass regardless of whether these other documents are 
conveyed by the seller. 
For example, in Allstate, an employee decided to personally purchase a vehicle 
from a company that leased vehicles to his employer. Allstate, 868 P.2d at 111. The 
employee tendered payment, but before legal title formally transferred, the vehicle was 
involved in an accident. Id. The employee's insurance company (Allstate) and the 
employer's insurance company (Liberty Mutual) disputed who held title to the vehicle at 
the time of the accident and thus, who was ultimately responsible for insuring the 
accident. Id. at 112. The Court held that the employee was, "at the time of the accident, 
the purchaser, possessor, and equitable title holder" of the vehicle, even though "legal 
title had not yet formally been transferred into his name." Id. at 113 (emphasis added). 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on Jackson, which provides that the 
provisions ofl i (\A ^ 41-I-7? ;in/ "procedural 01 evidential) in luiturc""1 in urderto 
provide warning to prospective transferees. Allstate Ins. Co., 868 P.2o ai . -,: • ;:ig 
Jackson, 89 P.2d at 237. As stated above, this section was "written to protect innocent 
pi ii chasers and th ird parties from o--;- -•< = : ; were] not intended to be controlling as 
between the parties to the transaction 
In addition, in State Farm Mutual Insurance Company v. Holt, 503 P.2d 1205 
(IJtah :lJ "JV an employee was purchasing a vehicle from his employer through monthly 
jv;vp- - *,A ioi is Id. at 1 205, Ilie ei nployee I ecerved possession of the vehicle, but 
the employer retained the title and registration pending fiill payment Id. Subsequently, 
the employee was involved in an accident and a dispute arose as to who was the owner 
and who was liable for the vehicle, Id. "According to Holt, equitable title passes to the 
•• . -U:i-c~ ..:•• - • • J L •. • ' .ii.- i-;. -'nai requirements of § 41-1-
72 are not complete."2 Allstate, 868 P.2d at 113. See also II •/: 'H r :<] •* l. 
Also, in Dahl v. Prince, 230 P.2d 328 (Utah 1951), the appellants contended that 
(be failure of the transferor to "effectuate a transfer of title on the records of the State Tax 
Commission, had the same effect u^  it'n<» \iilr hud been omsuuimated , , ' Id. at \Ml. 
However, the Court held that "[ojbviously, the equitable title passes to the r. r h:-;s- • ipon 
a bona fide sale for value." Id. The statute requiring re-registration is "for the legal title 
to pass lo the purchaser . ^ • , statute makes the registration evidence 
of title and ownership, for tiic pi • • i • • •'«:•.. i;: - ; ' " \I, 
2
 See footnote No. 1. 
Similar to the employee in Allstate, Cazares had tendered some payment, but he 
had not received a formal transfer of title. Nonetheless, Cazares held equitable title to the 
Tundra, Navigator and Hydroswift even though "legal title had not yet formally been 
transferred into his name." Allstate Ins. Co., 868 P.2d at 113. Likewise, the employee in 
Holt and Cazares both made payments for some period of time, yet they never received 
formal, legal title. However, the Court should find, as in Holt, that Cazares received 
equitable title despite the lack of formal requirements being completed. Further, under 
Dahl, Cazares became the equitable title owner of the relevant vehicles upon the bona 
fide agreement for sale of the vehicles. The purpose of the registration and title statutes 
are to give notice to innocent purchasers and are only necessary for legal title to pass. 
Accordingly, since Cazares received equitable title to the Tundra, Navigator and 
Hydroswift, his argument that Smith allegedly failed to convey interest in these vehicles 
is without merit. Cazares obtained an equitable interest in the vehicles by entering into 
a bona fide sale, taking possession of the vehicles and making some payment? toward 
the vehicles. Smith's failure to comply with U.C.A. § 41-1A-702 and U.C.A. § 41-1A-
902 does not affect whether Smith conveyed his interest in the vehicles. These provisions 
are merely procedural and are intended to protect potential innocent buyers. 
B. Smith's Failure to Comply With Statutory Requirements Does Not 
Negate Cazares9 Contractual Obligations 
Although Smith may not have complied with the statutory requirements 
presented by Cazares, such does not negate Cazares' contractual obligations. Pursuant 
to Cazares' argument, merely because of a failure by Smith to comply with the 
statutory provisions, Cazares would be entitled to retain and use the vehicles, fail to 
make contractually required payments and subsequently disclaim all obligations to 
Smith since legal title had not yet passed. In fact, this is exactly what he tried to do. 
Cazares had possession and use of the Tundra for eight months, during which time he 
failed to make payments and now he is asserting that he has no responsibility for this 
vehicle. The trial court correctly held, "I don't, I simply don't think that creates a 
private right of action and that that negates the contractual obligations the parties 
entered into." R. at 266:19-21. 
Accordingly, Cazares may not negate his contractual obligations merely because 
Smith did not convey legal title to the vehicles pursuant to U.C.A. § 41-1A-702 and 
U.C.A. § 41-1A-902. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT SMITH IS 
ENTITLED TO DAMAGES PURSUANT TO U.C.A. § 70A-2-709 
Cazares argues that the default provision in each agreement between the parties is 
allegedly illusory and unenforceable. However, this appeal issue is without merit and 
should be dismissed since Smith did not seek to enforce the default provision, but he 
instead sought his actual damages pursuant to U.C.A. § 70A-2-709. 
The trial court correctly found that Smith's remedy for Cazares' breach of contract 
was an action for the price pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"). R. at 
166. The remedies provided by the UCC, "shall be liberally administered to the end 
that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully 
performed." U.C.A. § 70A-1-106. Specifically, an action for price exists, "[w]hen 
the buyer fails to pay the price as it becomes due." U.C.A. § 70A-2-709(l). See also 
R. at 166. Further, if Smith has control of the goods, he is obligated to mitigate 
damages by making "reasonable efforts to resell the goods at a reasonable price", 
unless "circumstances reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing." Id. 
Cazares is not appealing the trial court's finding that he failed to make payments on 
the three contracts as they became due, nor did he dispute this in the trial court. R. at 
166. Further, although Cazares indirectly challenges the trial court's finding that Smith 
mitigated his damages, Cazares does not specifically raise this issue on appeal. Smith 
mitigated his damages by allowing the lenders to repossess the vehicles, allowing the 
lenders to resell the vehicles in a reasonable fashion and giving Cazares credit for the 
amount his loans were reduced as a result of the auction sales. Id. 
In addition, the trial court correctly found that Smith was also entitled to incidental 
costs of the sale incurred "in connection with return or resale of the goods or otherwise 
resulting from the breach/' U.C.A. § 70A-2-709(l) and § 70A-2-710. See also R. at 
164. Cazares' breach of the agreements caused Smith to default on his agreements and 
Smith subsequently incurred incidental costs on the resale of the vehicles. 
Accordingly, Cazares' appeal regarding the default provision should be denied since 
Smith sought damages pursuant to the UCC and not under this provision of the 
agreements. Even if the default provision was supposedly invalid, such would not 
affect the trial court's ruling on damages and thus, it is unnecessary to examine the 
validity of the default provision. 
VI. SMITH IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND 
COSTS 
Pursuant to the parties' contracts, Smith is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees 
and costs on appeal if he prevails. "A court may award costs and attorney's fees to 
either party that prevails in a civil action based upon...written contract...." U.C.A. § 
78-27-56.5. Further, the trial court found that, "[e]ach of the agreements entered into 
between the parties provide for an award of reasonable attorneys fees and costs to the 
party prevailing in any action to enforce the terms of such agreement." R. at 230, f 33 
(emphasis added). 
In addition, " [t]he general rule is that when a party who received attorney fees 
below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on 
appeal." Utah Deft ofSoc. Servs. V. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). See also Tretheway v. Furstenau, 40 P.3d 649, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) 
(citations omitted). The trial court found that "Smith [was] entitled to an award of 
reasonable attorney's fees under the terms of the agreements...." R. at 228, f 9. 
Accordingly, pursuant to the contracts between the parties and Smith's award of 
attorneys' fees below, Smith is also entitled to attorneys' fees and costs if he prevails 
on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in this brief, Plaintiff/Appellee Kirby Smith respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm the trial court's judgment, and deny this appeal in its 
entirety. Further, Smith requests an award of attorneys' fees and costs incurred in 
defending this appeal. 
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